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THE SEMANTIC CONCEPTION OF PROOF
NIK WEAVER
1.
Classically, the notions of truth and provability are both directly tied to the
meanings of the logical constants. The typical setting involves a model M and
a language L which is to be interpreted in M . The informational content of L
is determined by the way we specify which sentences of L are true. Fixing an
interpretation, the usual way to do this is to begin by defining a function from
the atomic formulas of L into the set {true, false} in some way that reflects the
structure of M . We then extend this function to complex formulas recursively by
means of truth conditions (e.g., A ∧ B is true iff A is true and B is true). This is
the classical account of the role of truth in specifying the meanings of the logical
constants.
We also have a notion of deductive reasoning as the means by which we come to
know which sentences are true. Proofs typically proceed though a series of inferences
which conform to certain deduction rules. These rules can be formulated in terms
very similar to the truth conditions, in a way that also transparently reflects the
meanings of the logical constants (e.g., given A and B one may infer A ∧ B, and
given A ∧ B one may infer both A and B) [2]. It is easy to see that deductions
preserve truth, so that any proof which proceeds from axioms which are true in the
model will establish a conclusion which is also true in the model. Thus anything
which is provable should be true, but there is no reason to expect the converse to
hold in general.
However, this implication (provable implies true) can only be affirmed for formal
proofs relative to some system of axioms which are known to be true. It is a
weakness of the classical picture that we do not have a general account of how we
are to go about choosing the axioms on which we base our proofs. The seriousness
of this problem can already be seen in the case of first order number theory, where it
is generally accepted that the usual Peano axioms, for instance, do not exhaust our
knowledge of what is true in the model. Indeed, because the true sentences of first
order arithmetic are not recursively enumerable, we will always have the capacity
to strengthen any recursively presented formal system for number theory that is
known to be sound by adding a (standardly expressed arithmetical) statement of
its consistency. This consistency statement cannot have been formally provable in
the original system, but if we can see that that system is sound then its consistency
is certainly provable in an informal semantic sense. And if we do not recognize that
the original system is sound, then the formal proofs of that system clearly cannot
function as genuine proofs in a semantic sense. So in neither case do the formal
proofs of the given system adequately express the semantic concept of a valid proof.
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These considerations suggest that the semantic notion of a valid proof as a linguistic
object which compels rational assent is not so easy to formally capture.
The subtlety of the semantic notion of a valid proof, in contrast to the straight-
forwardness of the syntactic notion of a valid proof within a formal system, might
lead us to focus on the latter at the expense of the former. But we should not lose
sight of the fact that the main reason we care about formal proofs is because we
think they exhibit semantic validity.
2.
The classical picture outlined above is unsuited to cases where we are not able
to affirm that every atomic formula of the language has a well-defined truth value
in the model (relative to a given interpretation). There are various ways this can
happen. For instance, the recursive enumerability issue mentioned above makes it
doubtful that the assertion “A is provable”, in the sense of semantic provability
(and restricting to proofs of finite length), can be said to have a definite truth value
for every sentence A of first order number theory.
Actually, once we are in the business of explicitly reasoning about semantic
provability, there is no need to invoke Go¨delian incompleteness to make this point.
It is easy to see directly how assigning a truth value to a sentence that asserts the
soundness of some deduction rule could be problematic. For in order to do this
we would need to know whether the rule preserves truth, but that would depend
on which sentences are true, and could potentially hinge on the truth value of the
sentence under consideration. A vicious circle is possible.
Thus, when we are reasoning about provability, we cannot necessarily assume
that every atomic proposition has a definite truth value. This creates difficulties
for the interpretation of the logical constants; we can no longer characterize them
in terms of truth conditions. The constructivist solution to this sort of problem is
to take the deduction rules, rather than the truth conditions, as our starting point.
This is possible because the deduction rules, despite intuitively having essentially
the same content as the truth conditions, are nonetheless formulated without refer-
ence to truth values. Thus, classically, we use truth conditions to give meaning to
the logical constants, and we justify the deduction rules by observing that they pre-
serve truth, but constructively, we discard the truth conditions, regard provability
as primary, and use the deduction rules to give meaning to the logical constants.
The rules for ∧ tell us what ∧ means in the sense that they tell us under what
circumstances we are entitled to assert A ∧ B: we are entitled to assert A ∧ B
precisely if we are entitled to assert both A and B. This approach gives us a way
to reason about formulas that might not have definite truth values.
An unfortunate byproduct of this emphasis on provability is that constructivists
are not always careful about distinguishing between a statement and the assertion
that that statement is provable.1 The two are not synonymous. That we can
prove there are infinitely many primes is indeed what licenses us to assert there are
infinitely many primes, and we can arguably regard the meaning of the assertion
that there are infinitely many primes as residing in our characterization of what
constitutes a proof of this assertion, but saying there are infinitely many primes is
1E.g., “The assertion of A ∨ ¬A is therefore a claim to have, or to be able to find, a proof or
disproof of A” ([1], p. 21). More correct would be “We are entitled to assert A ∨ ¬A if we have,
or are able to find, a proof or disproof of A.”
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not the same as saying we can prove there are infinitely many primes. One is a
statement about numbers, the other a statement about proofs. For our purposes
here, preserving this distinction is absolutely crucial.
3.
We take a proof to be a syntactic object — not a “procedure” or a “construction”
— that compels rational acceptance of some conclusion. We consider the proof
relation to be a primitive notion that cannot be defined in any simpler terms. The
most basic feature of a valid proof, in this conception, is that it must be recognizably
valid. That is, if p proves A then we must in principle be able to recognize that
p proves A. This is inherent in what we mean by a proof. If we cannot see that
p compels us to accept A, then we do not consider p to be a proof of A in the
semantic sense of concern to us here.
It is not important for us whether proofs are expressed linearly or as trees (or
in some other way), just that they be syntactic objects. We assume only that we
have a notion of one proof being contained within another and that for any two
proofs there is a third that contains both of them. Also, we will allow proofs to
contain extraneous material. It is not clear how a prohibition on inessential content
could be formulated, but even if it could, doing so would be inconvenient for us.
Therefore we stipulate that if p proves A then p′ also proves A, for any proof p′
containing p.
We now want to work out how the meanings of the various logical constants can
be expressed in terms of the proof relation. For instance, we take a proof of A ∨B
to be something which is either a proof of A or a proof of B. Thus p proves A ∨B
if and only if p proves A or p proves B. Similarly, a proof of A ∧ B is something
which is both a proof of A and a proof of B. (Allowing proofs to contain extraneous
material simplifies things here; a proof of A∧B does not have to be a pair of proofs,
it can simply be a proof that contains both a proof of A and a proof of B.) So p
proves A ∧B if and only if p proves A and p proves B.
A proof of (∃x)A(x) must describe a construction, prove that the construction
produces a unique object a, and prove the statement A(a). Since it is a name for an
object, not the object itself, that appears in the assertion A, in order to give a proof
interpretation of existential quantification we need to require that every individual
in the model be represented by a term in the language. This can always be assured
by simply including a constant symbol in the language for each individual in the
model. (Cf. the need to represent abstract objects by concrete proxies, discussed
in Section 3 of [4].)
Our accounts of (∀x)A(x) and A → B require a more detailed explanation. In
the traditional literature their proof interpretations ask for a construction which,
for each object a, produces a proof of A(a), or a construction which converts any
proof of A into a proof of B. This kind of formulation is implausible on its face. For
example, consider a computer program that inputs natural numbers a, b, c, and n,
and then, if n ≥ 3, prints out a step-by-step evaluation of both an + bn and cn and
a verification that they are unequal (say, by comparing them digit by digit). Since
Fermat’s last theorem is true, it follows that this procedure does in fact convert any
quadruple (a, b, c, n) such that n ≥ 3 into a proof that an + bn 6= cn. So according
to the definition just mentioned, this trivial procedure would count as a proof of
Fermat’s last theorem.
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We might consider adding a clause to the effect that the procedure must not
only produce a proof of A(a) for each a, but also be recognized to do so. (In fact, it
is clear that we have to do this if we are to sustain our requirement that any proof
can be recognized to be a proof.) The problem here is that recognizing that it is
possible to generate a proof of A(a) is not the same as being compelled to accept
A(a). It is, rather, the same as being compelled to accept that A(a) is provable.
This is just the distinction we emphasized earlier between asserting some statement
and asserting that that statement is provable. There really is no way to maintain it
here because it is essential to the construction viewpoint that one does not actually
have a proof of A(a) for every a, one only has a way of generating these proofs.
This issue might be confusing because of the condition that any valid proof must
be recognizably valid. It follows from this condition that if p proves A then it not
only compels acceptance of A, it must also compel acceptance of the fact that it
proves A. This means that any proof of (∀x)A(x) would actually also prove that
A(a) is provable for every a. But it is the converse implication (going from “A(a) is
provable” to A(a)) that would be needed to justify the construction interpretation.
The only thing we can do is to define a proof of (∀x)A(x) to be a single argument
p which, for every object a, compels us to accept the statement A(a). Now, it is
natural to object that demanding a uniform proof of A(a) is too restrictive. The
concern is that it might be possible to, in some uniform way, generate proofs of A(a)
for various values of a without being able to give a single proof that simultaneously
covers all cases. But this objection is not well-taken. Not only does it, as we have
just explained, ignore the distinction between proving A(a) and proving that A(a)
is provable, it also fails on its own terms. For suppose we had a construction that
produced a proof of A(a) for every a. How could we know that it did this? If
there are a proper class of possible values of a then direct inspection is not an
option. But asking the construction to be accompanied by a collection of proofs,
one for each a, that it produces a proof of A(a) would be absurd; if we allowed
that then we could just as well discard the construction altogether and simply ask
for a collection of proofs of A(a), one for each a. On the other hand, demanding
a single uniform proof that the construction produces a proof of A(a) for every a
negates the original basis of the objection. Any approach at some point has to come
down to a single proof; all the construction viewpoint accomplishes is to erase the
distinction between a statement and the assertion that that statement is provable.
Similar comments apply to implication. Again, to prove A→ B it is not enough
to know that we can use any proof of A to generate a proof of B; if anything, that
would establish that A is provable implies B is provable, not that A implies B.
The proper formulation is that a proof of A→ B is an argument that, granting A,
compels rational acceptance of B. We can say that p proves A→ B if and only if
every p′ ⊇ p that proves A also proves B.
Now that we have clarified universal quantification, we can say a little more
about existential quantification. Consider statements of the form (∀x)(∃y)A(x, y).
By what we just said, any proof of such a statement must be a single argument
p which, for every object a, proves (∃y)A(a, y). If a ranges over a proper class of
values then we cannot expect p to explicitly present the corresponding b in every
case. Here we must accept the construction point of view and ask that p merely
tell how to generate b. Of course it must also prove that the generating procedure
works, and that A(a, b) holds.
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This completes our informal explication of the logical constants in terms of prov-
ability. Negation is handled by taking ¬A to be an abbreviation of A→ ⊥, where
⊥ represents some canonical falsehood.
We can also reason about the proof relation itself. The idea that proofs are
recognizable implies that if p proves A then the empty proof proves that p proves
A. In the reverse direction, it is certainly the case that whenever we have proven
a statement we accept that statement. However, we cannot take this implication
as an axiom because of the possible circularity involved in its application to proofs
in which it appears. It can only be formulated as a deduction rule: given that p
proves A, infer A. We will elaborate on this point below.
The proof interpretation of the logical constants presented in this section imme-
diately justifies the usual axioms and rules of minimal first order predicate calculus.
(In particular, the empty proof proves every tautology.) Thus we are now free to
reason accordingly. To recover intuitionistic logic in some setting we would need
to give a special justification for the ex falso quodlibet law, and to recover classi-
cal logic we would also need to give a special justification for the law of excluded
middle.
4.
Write p ⊢ A for “p proves A”. To assert that A is provable is to assert that
there exists a proof of A. Writing A for “A is provable”, we therefore have
A ≡ (∃p)(p ⊢ A). Basic laws relating provability to the logical constants can now
be derived. For instance, a proof of (A ∨B) would have to construct some p and
prove that p ⊢ (A ∨B). But this means it would either prove p ⊢ A or p ⊢ B, and
in either case it would then be a proof of A ∨ B. Thus we see that (A ∨ B)
implies A ∨ B in general. Conversely, any proof of A ∨ B is either a proof
of A or B, so that it constructs some p and proves either p ⊢ A or p ⊢ B, and
in either case is qualifies as a proof of (A ∨B). We conclude that (A ∨B) and
A ∨B are equivalent. The equivalence of (A ∧B) and A ∧B can be seen
in a similar way, this time using the property that if p proves A and q proves B,
then any proof containing both p and q proves both A and B.
A proof of (∀x)A(x) constructs p and proves p ⊢ A(a) for every object a.
Therefore, for each a it proves A(a). Thus (∀x)A(x) → (∀x)A(x). The con-
verse direction is not evident because having a separate proof of A(a) for each a
should not entail that there is a single proof of A(a) for all a. An exception can be
made if proofs are allowed to be as large as the range of values of a: for instance,
if a ranges over a finite set and proofs can be any finite size, then proofs for each a
actually could be amalgamated into a single proof of (∀x)A(x). Or if the range of
values of a is countable and we allow proofs of countable size, then again such an
amalgamation is possible. A natural choice is to let proofs be as large as any set;
then the law (∀x)A(x)→ (∀x)A(x) would hold if x ranges over a set of values,
but not if it ranges over a proper class of values.
A proof of (∃x)A(x) would construct a and p and prove p ⊢ A(a). So it
would prove p ⊢ (∃x)A(x); thus (∃x)A(x) → (∃x)A(x). Conversely, a proof
of (∃x)A(x) would construct p and prove p ⊢ (∃x)A(x). We would then like to
extract an object a such that p ⊢ A(a), but that assumes the soundness of p, so we
cannot draw this inference. Again, we will elaborate on this point below.
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For implication, a proof of (A→ B) identifies p and proves p ⊢ (A→ B), i.e.,
it proves that p′ proves A implies p′ proves B for any proof p′ containing p. Putting
this together with a proof of A, i.e., a construction of q such that q ⊢ A, yields in
a uniform way (by adding the instruction to combine p and q) a proof of B. So
we have shown that (A→ B) implies A→ B. The converse is not evident.
We also consider the general relationship between A and A. Recall that if p
proves A then ∅ proves that p proves A; this yields that the empty proof is always
a proof of A→ A. The converse is not evident. For suppose we have a proof that
A is provable, i.e., a construction of p and a proof that p proves A. To extract a
proof of A from this premise we would need to rely on the inference from having a
proof of p ⊢ A to simply having p ⊢ A. So we would have to use the law A→ A
which we are trying to prove. There is no obvious way around this circularity. We
can only affirm the deduction rule: given A, infer A.
To summarize, we have the axioms
(A ∨B) ↔ A ∨B
(A ∧B) ↔ A ∧B
(∃x)A ← (∃x)A
(∀x)A → (∀x)A
(A→ B) → (A→ B)
A → A
and the deduction rule that infers A from A, with the implication (∀x)A →
(∀x)A also holding if there is a suitable size restriction on the range of values of
x.
5.
The most important conclusion we reached in the last section is that we do not
have a right to affirm the law A → A in general. This may be counterintuitive
because it seems as though having a proof that there is a proof of A should be
just as good as having a proof of A. Once we have accepted a line of reasoning
which establishes that p proves A we ought to then accept p as a proof of A. The
problem is the circularity that arises when we try to affirm this inference as a
general principle. It becomes circular when it is adopted as a universal law because
it then has the effect of affirming the soundness of proofs in which it might itself
have been used.
The situation is analogous to the difficulty associated with formal systems that
prove their own consistency. Once we have accepted a formal system S we do
generally agree to accept a stronger system S ′ obtained by augmenting S with a
(standardly expressed arithmetical) assertion of the consistency of S. However, the
new consistency axiom is only applied in retrospect, to affirm the correctness of
reasoning which could be executed in the original system S. We should not accept
a new axiom which expresses the consistency not of the original system, but of the
new system formed by adjoining that axiom itself. That would be circular, and
we know from Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem that it is not a benign sort
of circularity; any such axiom would have to give rise to an inconsistency. In just
the same way, once we accept some formal system we should agree, whenever that
system proves that A is provable, to accept A; but we should not agree to vouch
for the original system augmented by the axiom A→ A. Adding the latter axiom
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would affirm the soundness not just of all proofs in the original system, but also of
all proofs in the augmented system, including proofs that employ the new axiom
itself.
Maintaining a distinction between A and A is essential for properly handling
the semantic paradoxes involving provability [5]. Most importantly, given that some
statement L entails that a contradiction is provable, i.e., L→ ⊥, we cannot infer
that L is false, i.e., L → ⊥. Since we do have ⊥ → ⊥ as a special case of the
law A → A, an inference can be drawn in the opposite direction: given L → ⊥
we may deduce L→ ⊥. In this sense the assertion L→ ⊥, which is the standard
negation of L, is stronger than the assertion L → ⊥. We call L → ⊥ the weak
negation of L and when we have proven this we say that L is weakly false.
The semantic paradoxes involving provability collapse when we are careful to
distinguish a statement from the assertion that that statement is provable. For
instance, let L be a sentence which asserts that its negation is provable. Assuming
L, we can then immediately infer ¬L. We can also infer L from L, as an instance
of the general law A→ A. Putting these together yields L→ ⊥, i.e., L is weakly
false. Taking ¬L as a premise instead allows us to infer ¬L, which is equivalent
to L, and this shows that ¬L is false. So the conclusion we reach is that L is weakly
false and ¬L is false. But there is no contradiction here.
In this example the distinction between falsity and weak falsity is crucial. If
the two were equivalent then we would have proven both ¬L and ¬¬L, which is
absurd. What this means is that it is not merely the case that we cannot affirm
the implication ⊥ → ⊥. Since this implication would imply that falsity is equiv-
alent to weak falsity, it would, together with the preceding analysis of L, yield a
contradiction. In other words, we have shown (⊥ → ⊥) → ⊥, which can also be
written as ¬(⊥ → ⊥) or as ¬¬⊥. Thus, in the case where A equals ⊥, we can
affirm that the law A→ A is false.
This conclusion would be unacceptable if we were to interpret implication clas-
sically. According to the classical interpretation, the only way an implication can
fail is if the premise is true and the conclusion is false; so the law ⊥ → ⊥ could
only fail if ⊥ were actually provable. But then, if we were reasoning classically we
could apply the law of excluded middle to L and infer ⊥ from the fact that both
L and ¬L are weakly false. So in fact we could actually prove ⊥.
This only confirms our earlier judgement that it is inappropriate to reason about
provability classically. Indeed, liar type sentences are just the sort of thing that
show us we may not always be in a position to assign definite truth values to
assertions about provability. So we have to reason constructively, and affirming
that ⊥ → ⊥ is false is perfectly reasonable under a constructive interpretation
of implication. It merely expresses the idea that if we could find some way of
converting any (hypothetical) proof that a falsehood is provable into a proof of a
falsehood, then a contradiction would result. In simpler language, assuming that ⊥
is unprovable leads to a contradiction. As we explained above, this assumption is
indeed unwarranted because it hinges on the global soundness of all proofs, and any
proof whose soundness is justified by invoking the global soundness of all proofs is
a proof whose justification is circular.
Here too there is an analogy with the Go¨delian analysis of consistency in number
theoretic systems. We can prove, in Peano arithmetic, that if PA proves Con(PA)
then PA proves 0 = 1. Since Con(PA) is just the statement that 0 = 1 is not
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provable in PA, this amounts to saying that assuming PA proves that 0 = 1 is
unprovable in PA leads to a contradiction in PA. This mirrors our conclusion that
assuming ⊥ is unprovable leads to a contradiction.
6.
In the last section we showed how a certain liar type sentence narrowly avoids
paradox. This happens because we lack both the law A→ A (otherwise we could
prove ⊥) and the law of excluded middle (otherwise we could prove ⊥, and then
infer ⊥). We now want to prove in a formal setting that the kind of reasoning
exhibited above actually is consistent, even when dealing with circular phenomena.
We formulate a propositional system P for reasoning about assertions which
reference each other’s provability in a possibly circular way. The atomic formulas
of the language consist of the falsehood symbol ⊥ together with finitely many
propositional variables φ1, . . ., φn. Complex formulas are generated from the atomic
formulas by the rule that whenever A and B are formulas, so are A ∧ B, A ∨ B,
A→ B, and A.
The logical axioms and rules of P are those of a minimal propositional calculus,
together with the axioms and rule for  presented in Section 4 (minus the two
axioms for quantification).
The nonlogical axioms of P will consist of a list of formulas φ1 ↔ A1, . . .,
φn ↔ An, where each Ai can be any formula in which every propositional variable
lies within the scope of some box operator. Thus φ1 ↔ ¬φ1 and φ2 ↔ ¬φ2 are
acceptable axioms but φ3 ↔ ¬φ3 is not. The list might include liar pairs such as
φ4 ↔ φ5 and φ5 ↔ ¬φ4. The restriction on the Ai’s arises from the grammatical
distinction between asserting a proposition and merely mentioning its name. “The
negation of φ3” is not a cogent assertion; we have to say something like “φ1 is not
provable” or “the negation of φ2 is provable”.
It is easy to show that P minus the rule which infers A fromA is consistent: just
makeA true for every formula A and evaluate the truth of the φi and all remaining
formulas classically; then the set of true formulas contains all the theorems of P
but does not contain ⊥. Proving that k⊥ is not a theorem of this system for any
k is a little more substantial.
Theorem 6.1. P is consistent.
Proof. We define the level l(A) of a formula A of P as follows. The level of ⊥
and any formula of the form A is 1. The level of A ∧ B, A ∨ B, and A → B is
max(l(A), l(B)) + 1. The level of φi is l(Ai) + 1.
Now we define a sequence of sets of formulas F1, F2, . . .. These can be thought
of as the formulas which we have determined not to accept as true. The definition
of Fk proceeds by induction on level. When k = 1, the formula ⊥ belongs to F1
but no other formula of level 1 belongs to F1. For k > 1, ⊥ belongs to Fk and A
belongs to Fk for every formula A which belongs to Fk−1. For levels higher than 1,
we apply the following rules. If either A or B belongs to Fk then A ∧B belongs to
Fk. If both A and B belong to Fk then A ∨ B belongs to Fk. If Ai belongs to Fk
then φi belongs to Fk. Finally, if there exists j ≤ k such that B belongs to Fj but
A does not belong to Fj , then A→ B belongs to Fk.
An easy induction shows that the sequence (Fk) is increasing. We define F =⋃
Fk. It is obvious that ⊥ belongs to F . The proof is completed by checking
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that none of the axioms of P belongs to F , and that the complement of F is
stable under modus ponens and the inference of A from A. This is tedious but
straightforward. 
An identical argument would prove the consistency of a stronger system with
the box axiom for implication strengthened to (A → B) ↔ (A → B) and
minimal logic strengthened to intuitionistic logic. However, the justification for
these stronger axioms is unclear. In particular, there is no obvious way of defining ⊥
so as to justify the ex falso law in this setting. Since ⊥ could appear in the defining
formulas for the φi, a circularity issue arises if we try to build the implications
⊥ → φi into the definition of ⊥.
7.
Taking φ ↔ ¬φ as an axiom guarantees inconsistency, but as we have just
seen, φ ↔ ¬φ does not. Thus, inserting box operators into the axioms of an
inconsistent theory can sometimes make it consistent. We now want to describe a
general technique for proving results of the opposite type which state that in some
cases inserting box operators into axioms does not essentially weaken them.
Let T1 and T2 be formal systems based on the same underlying logic (classical,
intuitionistic, or minimal), such that the language of T2 is the language of T1 aug-
mented with . Also assume that the axioms and deduction rule for  are included
in the theory T2. Then we say that T2 weakly interprets T1 if, when all appearances
of  are deleted from the theorems of T2, the resulting set of formulas contains all
the theorems of T1. Informally, T2 weakly interprets T1 if T2 interprets T1 when we
ignore the difference between A and A. We have the following trivial result:
Proposition 7.1. If T2 weakly interprets T1 then the consistency of T2 implies the
consistency of T1.
This is just because if T1 were inconsistent then ⊥ would be a theorem of T1,
and weak interpretability then implies that k⊥ must be a theorem of T2 for some
k. Repeated application of the rule “infer A from A” then shows that ⊥ is a
theorem of T2.
We will now describe a procedure for inserting box operators into formulas that
lack them and prove that if the initially given formula is a theorem of a standard
(classical, intuitionistic, or minimal) predicate calculus then we can ensure that
the formula generated by our procedure will be a theorem of that predicate cal-
culus augmented by the axioms for . This result can be used to establish weak
interpretability results; we illustrate this in the corollary below.
Our procedure can be described as a game between two players, Attacker and
Defender, on a formula A. We think of Attacker as seeking to strengthen the
formula and Defender as seeking to weaken it. The way the game is played is
defined inductively on the complexity of A. If A is atomic then the game consists
of a single move in which Defender chooses a value of k (possibly zero) and prefixes
A with k. Attacker does not have a turn. The game is played on formulas of the
form A ∧ B by independently playing the game on A and B and conjoining the
results. It is played on A∨B by independently playing on A and B and disjoining
the results. It is played on (∃x)A and (∀x)A by playing on A and prefixing the
result with the relevant quantifier. Finally, it is played on A → B by first having
the players switch roles and play on A, producing a formula A′, then revert to their
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original roles and play on B, producing a formula B′. The result of this game is
the formula A′ → B′.
If the initially given formula is a theorem of a standard predicate calculus, then
Defender wins provided the formula generated by the game is a theorem of the
same standard predicate calculus augmented by the axioms for .
Theorem 7.2. Defender has a winning strategy on any theorem of a standard
predicate calculus.
Proof. All moves in the game consist in one of the players choosing a value of k and
prefixing an atomic formula with k for some k. Thus a strategy for either player is
given by specifying, for each of his moves, the value of k to be played as a function
of the values chosen by his opponent on all of the opponent’s earlier moves.
We order strategies by saying that S ≤ S′ if, at every play, for each choice of
earlier moves by the opponent, the value of k prescribed by S′ is greater than or
equal to the value prescribed by S. We claim that if Attacker plays the same moves
against two of Defender’s strategies, S and S′, such that S ≤ S′, then the formula
generated by the first game will imply the formula generated by the second game,
and if Defender plays the same moves against two of Attacker’s strategies, T and
T ′, such that T ≤ T ′, then the formula generated by the first game will be implied
by the formula generated by the second game. This is shown by a straightforward
induction on the complexity of the formula on which the game is played, taking
both claims for all simpler formulas as the induction hypothesis. It follows that
any strategy greater than a winning strategy also wins.
The theorem can be proven using Gentzen-style sequent calculus. We work with
the G1 systems of [3], using only atomic formulas in the axioms Ax and (in the
intuitionistic and classical cases) replacing the axiom L⊥ with the axioms ⊥ ⇒ A
for all atomic formulas A. We first extend the definition of the game so that it can
be played on sequents. On a sequent of the form Γ, A⇒ B,∆ where Γ and ∆ are
the context, the game is played by having Attacker and Defender switch roles and
play the game on the formulas of Γ in any order and then on A, then revert to their
original roles and play the game on B and then, finally, on the formulas of ∆ in any
order. The proof is completed by checking that Defender has a winning strategy on
any axiom, and if Defender has a winning strategy on the premises of a rule then
he has a winning strategy on the conclusion of that rule. This is straightforward
but tedious. In every case the strategy adopted by Defender on each formula in
the conclusion of a rule will be the strategy he used on the same formula in one
of the premises of that rule. Since increasing a winning strategy always produces
a winning strategy, if a formula appears in more than one premise we can assume
that Defender played the same strategy in both cases. 
Say that a formula is increasing if no implication appears in the premise of any
other implication. Note that since we take ¬A to be an abbreviation of A → ⊥,
this also means that an increasing formula cannot position a negation within the
premise of any implication, nor can it contain the negation of any implication.
Corollary 7.3. Suppose the nonlogical axioms of T2 are increasing and the nonlog-
ical axioms of T1 are those of T2 with all boxes deleted. Then T2 weakly interprets
T1.
Proof. Let B be any theorem of T1. We must find a way to insert boxes into B so
that it becomes a theorem of T2. Since T1 proves B, it is a logical consequence of
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finitely many nonlogical axioms Ai of T1; writing their conjunction as A =
∧
Ai we
then have that A→ B is a theorem of a standard predicate calculus. The problem
is to insert boxes into A and B, yielding new formulas A′ and B′, in such a way that
A′ → B′ is a theorem of standard predicate calculus augmented by the axioms for
, and such that each conjunct A′i of A
′ is implied by the corresponding nonlogical
axiom A′′i of T2. It will then follow that B
′ is a theorem of T2, as desired.
We achieve this result by playing the game described above on the formula
A→ B. We know that Defender can ensure that A′ → B′ is a theorem of standard
predicate calculus augmented by the axioms for , so all we need to do is to
prescribe a strategy for Attacker which ensures that each conjunct A′i of A
′ is
implied by the axiom A′′i .
The game is played on A→ B by first switching the players’ roles and playing on
A. So we reduce to a problem about finding a strategy for Defender when the game
is played on A, and this amounts to giving a strategy for Defender on each conjunct
Ai. We know that the formula A
′′
i is obtained from Ai by inserting boxes in some
way, and we need to provide Defender with a strategy for playing the game on Ai
in a way that ensures A′′i → A
′
i. We prove this can be achieved for any increasing
formula Ai recursively on its complexity. The only interesting case is when Ai is an
implication, Ai = Ai0 → Ai1. We require a lemma which states that if a formula
C contains no implications and C′ is obtained from C by inserting boxes in some
way, then C → C′ → jC (i.e., C → C′ and C′ → jC) for some value of j. This
is easily shown by induction on the complexity of C. This lemma can be applied to
Ai0 because Ai is increasing, so no matter how the game is played on Ai0 we will
have A′i0 → 
jAi0 → 
jA′′i0 for some j. Inductively Defender can then employ a
strategy on Ai1 which ensures that 
jA′′i1 → A
′
i1, and this yields that A
′′
i0 → A
′′
i1
implies
A′i0 → 
jA′′i0 → 
jA′′i1 → A
′
i1,
that is, A′′i implies A
′
i, as desired. 
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